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20th century physics has revealed a pervasive relational aspect of the physical world. This fact
is relevant in view of some of the motivations for panpsychism. In facts, it may be seen as a
vindication of the panpsychist idea of a monist continuity where some aspects of the consciousness’
perspectivalism are universal. But this same fact undermines the motivations for genuine forms of
panpsychism.
If some aspects of mind are universal, which ones are
so? I point out in this note that 20th Century physics has
already vindicated a –very mild– form of panpsychism.
This is because of the profoundly relational aspect this
physics, manifest in general relativity, but especially in
quantum mechanics. 20thCentury physics is not about
how individual entities are by themselves. It is about
how entities manifest themselves to one another. It is
about relations.
This is particularly evident for quantum theory, espe-
cially (but not uniquely) if one reads it in terms of its
relational interpretation [1, 2]. Niels Bohr expressed this
‘contextual’ aspect of quantum theory by saying that a
physical system can only be described taking into account
the systems it is interacting with. The current account
of the world in fundamental physics is therefore always
the account of how a system affects another system.
This implies that the most effective way of thinking
about the world is not in terms of entities with proper-
ties, but rather in terms of systems that have properties
in relation to other systems. In turn, this implies that
any physical description of a system is necessarily per-
spectival: relative to another system.
In the textbook Copenhagen formulation of quantum
theory, the physical system with respect to which proper-
ties take value is variously and a bit obscurely interpreted
as ‘the apparatus’, ‘the observer’, ‘the macroscopic world’
and similar. In relational quantum mechanics, the prop-
erties of a system S are defined with respect to any other
physical system O with which S interacts, and are rela-
tive to O [2]. Similarly, in the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics, variables have values only in rela-
tion to (components in a branch of) other systems when
the two have got entangled [3].
A direct consequence is that our physics today is not a
physics of the world seen from the outside. It is a physics
or the world always seen from the perspective a physical
system.
This is perhaps not panpsychism, because there is
nothing specifically psychic or mental in the relational
properties of a system with respect to another sys-
tem. But there is definitely something in common with
panpsychism, because the world is not described from
the outside: it is always described relative to a physical
system [4]. So, physical reality is, in our current physics,
perspectival reality [5].
On the other hand, this very relationalism may suffice
to resolve the very problems that motivated panpsychism
in the first place: do we really need elementary physics to
include more aspects in common with the mental world
than this? Which ones? All phenomena of which I am
aware that are more related to psyche or mind are con-
nected to a brain, a neural system, sensory organs, feed
back loops or the like. I cannot imagine anything even
vaguely more like psyche or mind, without some struc-
ture like those.
A motivation for panpsychism is the idea that there
is a ‘hard problem’ of consciousness [6]. This is the ex-
pectation that even if we had figured out how our body
works in terms of our current science, there would still be
something mysterious about ‘consciousness’. This expec-
tation is based upon an intuition: that subjective experi-
ence, the ‘first person perspective’, must be incompatible
with the world as we describe it now in physics. For in-
stance, Chalmers argues that it is conceivable to imagine
a body with the same physics as my body, but with no
subjective experience; hence subjective experience must
be over and above this physics [6].
I do not know how Chalmers can ‘conceive’ this: I
can’t. The point is that what we can ‘conceive’ de-
pends on the conceptual structure we have, and this
keeps changing and includes a big deal of presuppositions,
sometimes wrong. History of science should warn us that
trusting ‘intuition’ blindly can freeze us into wrong ideas.
We do not yet fully understand the physics of thunder-
storms, but trusting the compelling ‘intuition’ that light-
ning and thunder are evidence for the rage of Odin may
not be very wise.
More specifically, the intuition of a tension between
mental and physical is based on two assumptions. The
first is that the subject of experience is an irreducible en-
tity. The second is that the material world is formed by
substances having properties. There is indeed a tension
between these two concepts that appear radically dis-
tinct. In particular, mental phenomena are intentional:
they are relative to something else. Material phenomena
at first may seem incompatible with this.
Both these assumptions seems to me to be wrong.
There is a vast philosophical literature about the first
and I will not go into it. Rather, I focus here on the
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second. The intuition of the ‘material world’ as formed
by substance with properties, for instance just particles
moving in space, is based on 18th century physics. To-
day we have a much more subtle view of the physical
world. In particular, as I mentioned above, physics to-
day is about relations between systems, about how sys-
tems affect one another. In a precise sense, quantum
mechanics, in particular, has undermined the idea of an
elementary level where components matter can be de-
scribed independently from anything else.
If our basic understanding of the physical world is in
terms of more or less complex systems that interact with
one another and affect one another, the discrepancy be-
tween the mental ad the physical seems much less dra-
matic, and I do not see the need for stronger versions of
panpsychism.
This obviously is not a solution to the ‘easy problem’
of consciousness—figuring out the physics of the body
when mental processes happen. But it definitely under-
cuts, seems to me, the intuition underpinning the belief
that there is any ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. Men-
tal phenomena are like other complex phenomena, and
the existence of a subjective perspective is precisely the
generic situation in physics: how systems ‘appear to one
another’.
So, relationalism can be seen as a very mild form of
panpsychism. That is, there is something in common be-
tween mind and matter: they are ways reality of physical
systems manifest itself to other physical systems, which
is precisely what our physics currently describes.
The world as we know it today in physics is neither the
material world of 18th century mechanic philosophy, nei-
ther embodied with any peculiar proto-consciousness. It
is a world where physical systems –simple and complex–
manifest themselves to other systems –systems and
complex– in a way that our physics describes. I see no
reason to belief that this should not be sufficient to ac-
count for stones, thunderstorms and thoughts.
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